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Measuring regional business resilience
Anthony Sorokaa , Gillian Bristowb , Mohamed Naimc and Laura Purvisd
ABSTRACT
The concept of regional resilience is explored by understanding the resilience of individual ﬁrms within both the region (and
their capabilities to cope, adapt and reconﬁgure) and a constantly evolving economic environment. This study examines the
utility of the QuiScore credit indicator (from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database) to measure both ﬁrm and
regional economic resilience. Using the Cardiff Capital Region in Wales, UK (for the period 2006–16) as a case study, the
results indicate that the QuiScore is an effective indicator of the economic resilience of ﬁrms as well as an early warning
indicator of economic stresses for a region.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of resilience has, in recent years, emerged as an
important and desirable characteristic for manufacturing
ﬁrms, where resilience can be deﬁned as the vulnerability/
capacity of a company to survive and adapt, resist, decline,
and respond to opportunities (Valikangas, 2010).
There is a growing awareness of the importance of
understanding ﬁrm resilience and capacity to adapt to
shocks as a means of understanding the resilience of the
regions in which they are based – but to date, there has
been limited analysis of this. There is interest within the
regional studies community in regional resilience, in par-
ticular when examining how regions have fared during
the recent economic crisis (Bristow & Healy, 2014; Sen-
sier, Bristow, & Healy, 2016). As such the understanding
that resilience is a multidimensional property of regional
economies has grown over recent years, with the identiﬁ-
cation that it encompasses factors such as resistance, recov-
ery, reorientation and renewal (Martin & Sunley, 2015). In
such a form, it becomes a difﬁcult concept to operationalize
and measure to the extent that some consider it to be ‘self-
evidently common sense and yet conceptually and
programmatically elusive’ (Pain & Levine, 2012, p. 3).
Markman and Venzin (2014) state that whilst there is an
abundance of theory and empirical evidence on ﬁrm per-
formance measurements, there has been surprisingly little
work on the creation of a robust measure of ﬁrm resilience.
Furthermore, where measures of economic resilience have
been developed, they have tended to focus on the ex-post
measurement of how resilient regions were to a particular
shock or crisis such as the post-2008 global ﬁnancial crisis
(e.g., Sensier et al., 2016). Interest has been growing in
ﬁnding early warning indicators that could help economies
in advance of shocks occurring (Hermansen & Röhn,
2017), although to date there has been little investigation
of this beyond the national level.
To ﬁll in these gaps, the present study investigates the
utility of the QuiScore as a measure of ﬁrm resilience in
regions and, speciﬁcally, its capacity to provide insights
into potential ﬁrm and sectoral vulnerabilities and thus
threats to regional economic resilience. Focusing on a
case study based around the manufacturing sector within
the Cardiff Capital Region (CCR) in the UK, a sector
that accounted for 11.6% of jobs in Wales in June 2016,
within a region that accounts for about 50% of Welsh
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gross value added (GVA). This is despite the CCR geo-
graphically making up only 14% of the 20,779 km2 area
of Wales. The location of the CCR within Wales and
the UK as a whole is illustrated in Figure 1.
This study seeks to address two main questions:
. Is the QuiScore a meaningful and robust measure of a
ﬁrm’s resilience to economic shocks?
. What is the utility of this measure in enabling an
enhanced understanding of regional economic resili-
ence, speciﬁcally through its capacity to highlight key
ﬁrm and sectoral vulnerabilities for a region?
The paper is structured as follows. It next reviews the
literature, which examines the challenges in understanding
the relationship between ﬁrm resilience and regional resili-
ence. This establishes the potential value for regional econ-
omies in a measure of ﬁrm and sectoral vulnerabilities. The
data set and sampling method are then described, including
details of the QuiScore metric. This is then followed by an
investigation of the manufacturing sector in the CCR, resi-
lience to shocks, regional embeddedness and, ﬁnally, the
conclusions.
RELATED LITERATURE
Recent economic crises have fostered interest in the con-
cept of resilience in an effort to analyse and comprehend
differences between regions and their vulnerability to econ-
omic shocks (Bristow & Healy, 2014, 2018; Doran & Fin-
gleton, 2016; Martin & Sunley, 2015; Sensier et al., 2016).
A consensus is emerging in the evolutionary economic
geography literature that economic resilience of regions
can be deﬁned as the capacity of a regional or a local econ-
omy to withstand, recover from and reorganize in the face
of market, competitive and environmental shocks to its
developmental growth path (Boschma, 2015; Bristow &
Healy, 2014, 2018; Martin & Sunley, 2015). There is
growing appreciation that resilience is an intricate, multifa-
ceted property of regional economic systems embracing
resistance (the ability to resist disruptive shocks in the
ﬁrst place), recovery (the speed of return to some pre-
shock performance level), reorientation (the extent to
which the region adapts its economic structure) and
renewal (the degree to which the region resumes its pre-
shock growth path) (Bristow & Healy, 2018; Martin,
2011; Martin & Sunley, 2015).
In this multidimensional and evolutionary form, resili-
ence is a difﬁcult concept to operationalize and measure
(Pain & Levine, 2012, p. 3). Fundamentally, there is a ten-
dency to conﬂate and confuse resilience as a performance
outcome, an adaptive capacity or process, and a discursive
policy agenda (Bristow & Healy, 2014). Notwithstanding
this, it remains the subject to much conceptual and empiri-
cal debate (Boschma, 2015).
Much of the focus in the studies of regional economic
resilience to date has focused on the macro- or regional
scale and, speciﬁcally, upon the structures of regional econ-
omic systems. This has been valuable in understanding the
role of inherited production structures in shaping both the
sensitivity of regions to recessionary shocks and the impor-
tance of the capacity to diversify production structures in
securing resilience as reorientation and renewal (Boschma,
2015; Simmie & Martin, 2010). As such, it has been help-
ful in illuminating the path-dependent and evolutionary
nature of regional economies. However, this system and
structure emphasis has resulted in much less attention
being paid to understanding the role of human agency in
the adaptation at the heart of this conceptualization of resi-
lience (Bristow & Healy, 2014). Thus, whilst it is
Figure 1. Location of the Cardiff Capital Region (CCR) within both Wales and the UK.
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acknowledged that larger systems are driven by the inter-
actions between the diverse range of agents and their
environment, there has been relatively little analysis of
regional resilience with a microlevel focus (Billington,
Karlsen, Mathisen, & Pettersen, 2017).
There is good reason to argue that understanding
regional resilience, and thus any measure of it, implies an
understanding of the resilience of individual ﬁrms and
their speciﬁc capacities to cope with, adapt to and reconﬁ-
gure their technological, network and organizational struc-
tures within a constantly evolving economic environment
(Boschma, 2015; Swanstrom, 2008). The global economic
crisis of 2008 highlighted the signiﬁcant, often instrumen-
tal, role played by the strategic decisions and behaviours of
businesses (Hill et al., 2012). When faced with a shock and
falling demand, ﬁrms commonly respond in the short term
by cutting back on employment, helping them realize sav-
ings through reduced personnel costs. However, evidence
suggests that labour hoarding is becoming the preferred
strategy for certain ﬁrms (Holm &Østergaard, 2015; Möl-
ler, 2010), whereas solidarity and altruistic actions are an
important coping strategy that in the long run provides
resilience for enterprises operating in clusters (Wrobel,
2015). Evidence from Wales has suggested that the
Welsh government’s ProAct scheme launched in 2009,
which offered subsidized training places to companies
facing redundancies, encouraged labour retention and
helped mitigate the impact of the economic crisis by saving
some 10,000 jobs (Sensier & Artis, 2016).
There is much to be uncovered about the relationship
between ﬁrm resilience and regional resilience, however,
particularly in relation to whether and how indicators of
changes in ﬁrm resilience may act as early warning signals
for regional economies. In a recent contribution to this
debate, Billington et al. (2017) drew on the work of Leng-
nick-Hall, Beck, and Lengnick-Hall (2011) who see
organizational resilience as having three components:
behavioural, cognitive and contextual. ‘Behavioural resili-
ence’ is the ability of a company to pursue differing and
potentially counter-intuitive courses of action, character-
ized by internal routines of collaboration, ﬂexibility and
habits of continuous dialogue. ‘Cognitive resilience’ is a
mindset that allows a ﬁrm to respond to events in a
nuanced and creative manner, going beyond survival to
ﬁnd opportunities in adversity. ‘Contextual resilience’ pro-
vides the setting for integrating and using both cognitive
and behavioural resilience and embraces the building of
social capital by forming and strengthening trusting
relationships between people both within and without
the organization. Internally, it is typiﬁed by a culture sup-
portive of risk-taking, experimentation and admitting
mistakes, whilst externally a broad resource network pro-
vides an operational platform for the enterprise (Billing-
ton et al., 2017). Billington et al. observe that
contextual resilience, and speciﬁcally the importance of
the ﬁrm’s connections to the region through ownership
structures, localized supply chains and the labour supply,
needs further research. This is a gap that the present
study aims to address.
A critical gap also lies in the development of effective
measures of ﬁrm resilience. Markman and Venzin (2014)
assert that whilst theory and empirical evidence on ﬁrm
performance measurements abound, there has been sur-
prisingly little work to date on the development of a robust
measure of ﬁrm resilience, which they deﬁne as persistent
superior performance over a long (10-year) period. In an
exploratory study, they develop a measure of resilience
that combines ﬁnancial performance measures with vola-
tility data for ﬁnancial services ﬁrms. Their results suggest
the resilience of these ﬁrms is driven by a combination of
resource-capability mix, ﬁrm actions, historical events,
market contexts and industry conditions.
However, the volatility and return on equity
(VOLARE) measure has some limitations in that it has
been applied to only one speciﬁc part of the banking sector,
in particular larger banks. This raises potential questions
regarding the generalizability and scalability of the
measure. In addition, another potential cause for concern
is the use of the return on equity (RoE) measure of corpor-
ate ﬁnancial performance. The ﬂaw with RoE, which is
considered the most obvious, is that earnings can be
manipulated via changes in accounting policy. Additionally
RoE is calculated after the cost of debt but before account-
ing the cost of own capital so it increases with more ﬁnan-
cial gearing if the returns exceed the cost of the borrowings
(De Wet & Du Toit, 2007). As such there is clearly scope
for further investigation of potential measures of business
resilience and their capacity to help provide early indi-
cations of the strengths and vulnerabilities in the regional
economy associated with ﬁrm and sectoral performance.
This is another gap that the present study aims to address.
One such measure is QuiScore, a proprietary indicator
(from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) data-
base, which contains ﬁnancial and other data from about
4 million active UK registered companies and from about
7 million inactive or dissolved companies) of the ﬁnancial
health of a company (the likelihood of failure within the
next year), which can also be used to determine a company’s
credit worthiness. It has been previously applied to the
study of both individual ﬁrms and groupings (Greenaway,
Guariglia, & Kneller, 2007; Guariglia & Mateut, 2010;
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Mulhall, 2013), suggesting that
there is value in investigating whether it could serve as an
early warning indicator for economic resilience.
QuiScore provides an indicator of the probability of a
company failing within the year following the date of calcu-
lation, originally created by Qui Credit Assessment Ltd
(Pendlebury, Groves, & Groves, 2004): it is currently pro-
duced by CRIF Decision Solutions (Jeffrey, 2007). Bureau
van Dijk, which compiles the FAME database, states that
QuiScore is calculated using statistical and modelling tech-
niques to select and apply a weight to data elements (vari-
ables and coefﬁcients) that are most predictive of business
failure (FAME, 2015).
The data elements include account information such as
proﬁtability, solvency and leverage, plus director history;
registry trust information (county court judgements –
CCJs); shareholder funds; and lateness in ﬁling accounts
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(FAME, 2015). However, as a proprietary commercial
method (much like ﬁnancial metrics produced by Moody
or Standard & Poor), the method used for its calculation
is not publicly available. Researchers (Doumpos &
Pasiouras, 2005) have used a multi-criteria approach (the
UTilites Additives DIScriminantes (UTADIS) method)
to replicate the ﬁve-band classiﬁcation shown in Table 1.
However, the accuracy was about 70%, suggesting that fac-
tors such as CCJs and tardy ﬁling of accounts (which were
not used) may indicate underlying problems that are not
revealed by balance sheet data alone.
Within academic research the QuiScore has been
applied in a multitude of ways. As a metric of credit risk,
common applications have been in investigating the
strength of speciﬁc companies (Jeffrey, 2007) and the rat-
ing of credit risks (Baourakis, Conisescu, Van Dijk, Parda-
los, & Zopounidis, 2009).
QuiScores have also been used to investigate a variety of
enterprise-related (individual or groupings) factors. Appli-
cations have included investigating whether a relationship
exists between the volume of risk disclosures by an enterprise
and its performance measured via a variety of risk measures
(Linsley & Shrives, 2006), the relationship between ﬁnan-
cial health and exporting (Greenaway et al., 2007), how
the level of global engagement of a company is reﬂected in
its ﬁnancial health (Guariglia & Mateut, 2010), and how
private equity impacts upon innovation activities (Amess,
Stiebale, & Wright, 2015). It has also been used as a
means to identify (for study and evaluation) ﬁrms operating
in the UK West Midlands’ forging sector (Mulhall, 2013).
This use of QuiScore to investigate both individual ﬁrms
and groupings strongly suggests that its application for the
examination of the resilience of individual enterprises and
sectors is an appropriate exploratory technique.
According to Bureau van Dijk, QuiScore is provided as
a number between 0 and 100, with 0 representing those
companies with the highest likelihood of failure. As
shown in Table 1, the scores are divided into ﬁve separate
categories, with an associated likelihood of failure in the
next 12 months.
As such, in light of the main aim of the present study
(exploring the concept of regional resilience through
understanding the resilience of individual ﬁrms within
the region), we seek to answer two main questions:
. Is QuiScore a meaningful and robust measure of a ﬁrm’s
resilience to economic shocks?
. What is the utility of this measure in enabling the
enhanced understanding of regional economic resili-
ence, speciﬁcally through its capacity to highlight key
ﬁrm and sectoral vulnerabilities for a region?
DATA AND SAMPLE
The FAME data set was interrogated in 2016 for all com-
pany trading addresses using the search criteria detailed in
the following section. The UK Cardiff (CF) and Newport
(NP) postcodes cover the CCR and as such were applied as
a geographical ﬁlter. However, the NP postcode area also
includes small parts of England and someWelsh areas out-
side the constituent local authorities of the CCR. As such
they were excluded from the company search (NP8, NP16
7 and NP25 5QJ–RY).
All manufacturing sectors were selected using the UK
2007 two-digit Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC)
branch codes 10–32 (Food to Other Manufacturing),
resulting in 2228 active companies being identiﬁed. Once
all companies without a current QuiScore and any non-
manufacturing primary SIC codes (a non-manufacturing
ﬁrm may give a manufacturing secondary SIC) were elimi-
nated, this was reduced to 1785 active companies.
Within FAME, there is a historical record of previous
QuiScores covering a period of 10 years, providing a valu-
able source of longitudinal data covering the period just
before the ‘credit crunch’ and subsequent recession in the
UK. This is either accessible by year (so therefore the last
available year that would cover both active and dissolved
companies is 2006) or years away from the most recent
QuiScore, which is of particular beneﬁt for the study of
companies that are no longer trading. The search for
non-active companies, using the geographical and business
criteria used above for active companies, resulted in 1008
companies whose ﬁnal accounts were submitted as far
Table 1. QuiScore bands (adapted from FAME QuiScore description).
QuiScore
band Description
Likelihood of
failure (%)
100–81 Secure Companies tend to be large and successful public companies. Failure is very unusual and
normally occurs only as a result of exceptional changes within the company or its market
0%
80–61 Stable Company failure is a rare occurrence and will only come about if there are major
company or marketplace changes
0%
60–41 Normal This band contains many companies that do not fail, but some that do 6%
40–21 Unstable As the name suggests, there is a signiﬁcant risk of company failure; in fact, companies in
this band are, on average, four times more likely to fail than those in the normal band
11–29%
20–00 High risk Companies in the high-risk sector may have difﬁculties in continuing trading unless
signiﬁcant remedial action is undertaken, there is support from a parent company or
special circumstances apply. A low score does not mean that failure is inevitable
50–100%
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back as 1987. Once these were ﬁltered down to companies
that submitted ﬁnal accounts after 2006 and had a ﬁnal
QuiScore, this was reduced to 311 dissolved and in-liqui-
dation companies.
MANUFACTURING RESILIENCE WITHIN
THE CCR
Overview of the CCR
To produce an initial overview of the potential economic
strength and resilience of all active manufacturers within
the CCR, their current QuiScores are examined. As
shown by Jeffrey (2007), QuiScore can be used to provide
the predicted stability of companies. As shown in
Table 2, the present study scrutinized all the active compa-
nies extracted (n ¼ 1785). The top and bottom companies
were then ordered by FAME based on their turnover (a
total of n ¼ 429 companies). Finally the study looked at
companies with no recorded turnover (n ¼ 1356), that is,
those which by UK company law are not required to
report one, and speciﬁcally where two of the following
were true: turnover ≤ £6.5 million, a balance sheet ≤
£3.26 million and ≤ 50 employees. All these provided a
‘snapshot’ of the average state of manufacturing within
the CCR.
The results given in Table 2 are encouraging, from the
perspective of economic strength, in that the mean Qui-
Scores are all in the normal, stable or secure bands. It is
only the mode of the bottom 50 companies (by turnover)
where the companies are considered to be high risk.
When the data from those companies without reported
turnover are examined, it can be seen that the standard
deviation (SD) is sufﬁciently large that a signiﬁcant pro-
portion of them will fall into the unstable band. Of the bot-
tom 50 companies, 11 (22%) are unstable or high risk, and
for the 1356 no (recorded) turnover companies, 394 are
unstable or high risk (29%).
Table 2 shows an anomalous result in that the mean for
the top 50 companies is perceptibly lower (86.28) than that
for the top 51–100 or 101–250 companies (90.39 and
91.07 respectively). Analysis of the source data shows
that the cause appears to be that one company had a very
low QuiScore (QS ¼ 24), which distorted the mean.
The CCR manufacturing facilities of the company under-
went signiﬁcant restructuring within the past 15 years
(originally it planned to cease all CCR-based manufactur-
ing), its other UK operations underwent job loses within
that past two years, and also its registered ofﬁce (RO) is
outside the CCR, suggesting that its regional embedded-
ness might be low.
MANUFACTURING SECTORIAL
RESILIENCE WITHIN THE CCR
As different industrial sectors can exhibit different econ-
omic characteristics (cf. Disney, Haskel, & Heden, 2003;
Wakelin, 2001), there is merit in examining the manufac-
turing sector based on the UK SIC codes, speciﬁcally at the
two-digit branch code level. In order to examine the resili-
ence within individual industrial sectors, the average,
Table 2. Average QuiScores for active Cardiff Capital Region (CCR) manufacturing companies.
Average type Value, all Qui risk
All active (n ¼ 1785) Mean (SD) 56.51 (22.33) Normal
Mode 50.00 Normal
Median 51.00 Normal
Top 50 turnover (of n ¼ 429) Mean (SD) 86.28 (12.55) Secure
Mode 94.00 Secure
Median 91.00 Secure
Top 51–100 turnover (of n ¼ 429) Mean (SD) 90.39 (7.86) Secure
Mode 91.00 Secure
Median 91.00 Secure
Top 101–250 turnover (of n ¼ 429) Mean (SD) 91.07 (4.76) Secure
Mode 92.00 Secure
Median 92.00 Secure
Bottom 51–100 turnover (of n ¼ 429) Mean (SD) 77.18 (17.40) Stable
Mode 77.18 Stable
Median 77.18 Stable
Bottom 50 turnover (of n ¼ 429) Mean (SD) 54.24 (21.37) Normal
Mode 20.00 High risk
Median 51.00 Normal
No turnover (n ¼ 1356) Mean (SD) 47.74 (15.85) Normal
Mode 50.00 Normal
Median 48.00 Normal
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minimum and maximum QS and SD of the average to
±SD for each two-digit manufacturing SIC were calculated
(Figure 2).
Broadly, many of the sectors have similar character-
istics, with average QuiScores in the normal or stable
bands. However, two sectors are of interest in that they rep-
resent two differing extremes of QuiScore. First, Chemicals
(two-digit SIC code 20) has the highest average QS ¼
70.78, highest QS – SD ¼ 46.7 and second highest QS
+ SD ¼ 94.84 – so much so that all within the range are
> 40 and, hence, are in the normal band or better. Second,
Wearing apparel (two-digit SIC code 14) has the lowest
average QS ¼ 39.45, lowest QS – SD ¼ 19.44 and lowest
QS + SD ¼ 59.46.
Examining the data for CCR located but non-CCR
RO companies (see Table A1 in Appendix A in the sup-
plemental data online) and CCR RO companies (see
Table A2 online) shows that those companies not based
in the CCR have a tendency to have higher average Qui-
Scores, but a lower number of companies. This results in
CCR RO companies having a discernible impact on the
overall sector. Additionally, the results for non-CCR RO
Electrical (SIC 27) and Transport equipment (SIC 30) sec-
tors suggest there may be a negative skewed distribution
(although this could be an artefact of the relatively small
data set and the size of the companies).
RESILIENCE TO SHOCKS (WITHIN THE CCR)
In order to obtain a historical perspective on how compa-
nies respond to shocks and therefore obtain an indication
of their resilience, data on companies that are active, dis-
solved, in liquidation, in administration or in default are
examined in the following sections.
Change in QuiScore
As well as shocks caused by recessions and downturns,
there can be unknown shocks to a company that could be
reﬂected through a sharp fall in QuiScore (the metric is
based on multiple factors). Where QuiScore data are avail-
able for the last available year and the preceding year, the
percentage change in QuiScore is calculated for both active
(n ¼ 1679) and non-active (n ¼ 311) companies. Table 3
shows the proportion of dissolved (including in-liquida-
tion) and active companies that have undergone a particular
change in QuiScore. The results are indicative of a relation-
ship between the rate of fall and subsequent liquidation and
dissolution of a company, and that a small percentage fall in
QuiScore (< 10%) is experienced by approximately one-
quarter of (26.50%) active companies. Once the percentage
fall increases, the number of active companies experiencing
such a fall decreases exponentially. The average fall for dis-
solved companies was 43.2%; in total 67% of dissolved
companies experienced such a fall or greater compared
with < 2% of active companies. Of the dissolved companies
that experienced such a fall, 92.3% had a ﬁnal QuiScore <
20 (high risk). The average QuiScore change for active
companies is a growth of 13.83%, where a signiﬁcant pro-
portion (43.66%) showed no change, which drops to 7.4%
for dissolved companies.
The distribution of active and dissolved companies with
respect to the percentage change in QuiScore (from the
Figure 2. Average QuiScores for active manufacturing companies in the Cardiff Capital Region (CCR) (n ¼ 1785) using Standard
Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) manufacturing sectors (two-digit SIC).
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previous to the most recent QuiScore) and the most recent
QuiScore are shown in Figure 3. There is a cluster of non-
active companies whose percentage decrease in QuiScore is
> 25%, and whose ﬁnal QuiScore is < 25. The area bounded
by the black box shows the companies whose percentage
decrease in QuiScore is greater than the average for dissolved
companies (a change of < −43%) and whose ﬁnal QuiScore
is below the average for dissolved company (< 20%). Other
than seven active companies that fall within the range
(0.5% of active companies), the companies are dissolved.
Two outliers in Figure 3 show that a signiﬁcant increase
percentage-wise in QuiScore has taken place for a dissolved
company. The actual QuiScores are below normal risk, and
for QuiScore to have grown several hundred per cent the
previous score would have been very low.
When taking into account the previous results, this
suggests that a QuiScore when coupled with the annual
percentage change is a good indicator of potential failure,
with a ‘steady state’ exhibited through a small fall or rise
in QuiScore being an indicator of resilience, thus providing
companies and other organizations, such as governmental
bodies, with a means with which to sense potential pro-
blems and take remedial action.
Credit crunch and economic downturns
During the past decade there have been several shocks to the
UK economy: the credit crunch and subsequent 2008–09
recession and the 2011–12 economic downturn. As indi-
cated previously, the change in QuiScore has utility in the
analysis of company resilience. Therefore, the average per-
centage annual change in QuiScore for 994 active companies
(with QuiScores for all the years in the period 2006–13) is
plotted against the change period, together with a similar
plot for 132 dissolved (where data are available), in Figure 4.
For active companies, the average change in QuiScore
between 2006 and 2007 was 7.05%; between 2007 and
2008 it had reduced to 1.77%. There is a slight recovery fol-
lowed by another dip and then another recovery – a similar
pattern to that of UK economic growth. Within the context
of the UK, the start of the ‘credit crunch’ can be considered
to be the bank run on Northern Rock in September 2007,
the ﬁrst in the UK for over a century (Brunnermeier,
2009). Despite the reduced growth in QuiScore following
the credit crunch, there was no year-on-year fall in average
QuiScore (though this did occur with some individual com-
panies), suggesting that on average the active companies
within the region exhibited resilience to economic shocks.
Table 3. Change in QuiScore.
Change in
QuiScore (%)
Non-active
(n ¼ 311) (%)
Active
(n ¼ 1679) (%)
≥ 90% 0.64% 5.00%
≥ 80% 0.64% 5.42%
≥ 70% 0.64% 5.90%
≥ 60% 0.96% 6.08%
≥ 50% 0.96% 6.73%
≥ 40% 0.96% 7.15%
≥ 30% 1.61% 7.92%
≥ 20% 1.61% 10.90%
≥ 10% 2.25% 16.38%
> 0% 4.50% 29.84%
0% 7.40% 43.66%
< 0% 88.10% 26.50%
≤ −10% 85.21% 13.46%
≤ −20% 81.99% 5.54%
≤ −30% 77.81% 3.16%
≤ −40% 67.52% 1.67%
≤ −50% 57.23% 0.42%
≤ −60% 36.01% 0.06%
≤ −70% 11.90% 0.00%
Figure 3. Distribution of companies based on percentage change and QuiScore.
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The graph for inactive (dissolved or in liquidation)
companies shows a similar pattern that reﬂects changes in
UK gross domestic product (GDP) growth. However,
the signiﬁcant difference is that the change in average Qui-
Score is always negative.
To examine this further, dissolved companies were
grouped by the ﬁnal year of trading, as shown in Figure 5.
There is a pattern of particular interest: the groupings of
companies that fail tend to show two periods of falling
QuiScores and negative QuiScore growth; this trend is
shown for all but two years: speciﬁcally 2007 where there
are insufﬁcient historical data; and 2012 where the penul-
timate gradient of the fall is particularly steep (in 2012
the UK had two quarters of negative GDP growth). This
suggests that falling QuiScores for several consecutive
years could indicate a lack of resilience in that there was a
shock that had a negative impact on the company and it
was unable to recover from it. In addition, a very steep
fall could be an indicator of a lack of resilience. Figure 3
shows that some healthy companies have had a big fall in
QuiScore and could potentially be at risk, especially if
they fail to stabilize or recover. Such a fall should be an
indicator that remedial actions should be undertaken to
address the root cause of the problems.
REGIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF
COMPANIES
As observed by Billington et al. (2017), connections to a
region through ownership, supply chains and labour
Figure 4. Average annual change in QuiScore for active (n ¼ 994) and dissolved (including in liquidation) companies (n ¼ 132).
Figure 5. Average annual change in QuiScore for dissolved (including in liquidation) companies based on the ﬁnal known year of
active trading.
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requires investigation. The following sections analyse the
stability of companies based on their RO location and pat-
terns of behaviour when healthy companies are closed.
Examination based on registered ofﬁce location
Whilst the previous data and analyses provides an overall
impression of the state of the CCR, it makes no differen-
tiation between companies whose RO, and therefore in
most cases their head ofﬁces, are located outside of the
CCR and those whose ROs are within the CCR.
Table 4 breaks down the results by all companies, non-
CCR RO and CCR RO, and then disaggregates the data
to examine the Cardiff (CF) and Newport (NP) postcode
areas. As previously noted, not all companies have data
for both for the last available year and the preceding year
to calculate the change in QuiScore; therefore, the popu-
lation size is given in the corresponding column.
The most signiﬁcant result in Table 4 is that of those
manufacturers that have trading addresses in the CCR,
but whose RO is not within the CCR. The average Qui-
Score is noticeably higher than that of the CCR companies.
Linked to that is the large difference in change in QuiScore
between CCR and non-CCR ﬁrms, although this may
seem signiﬁcant the average starting point is higher, there-
fore any change is smaller. In addition, there is also a great
deal of stability in the non-CCR companies in that their
high QuiScore tends not to change from year to year.
Also of note is how similar the average and median
QuiScores are for All and CCR, CF and NP.
More in-depth analysis of these data was conducted
where average turnover and the mean and median trading
addresses were examined (for companies large enough to
report turnover). Upon analysis of the data, it was noticed
that there were ﬁve outlier companies (which are manufactur-
ing in the CCR) with over 400 trading addresses; these com-
panies were therefore excluded. This is shown in Table 5.
The results presented in Table 5 provide compelling
evidence that national or multinational ﬁrms are the top
companies in the CCR (with respect to turnover) due to
the number of registered trading addresses. Despite the
removal of ﬁrms with a high number of trading addresses,
the average number of addresses for non-CCR ﬁrms is
greater than 10. The median number of addresses is
three, showing that a substantial number of ﬁrms have
more than one or two trading addresses. There are two
broad categories of multi-address ﬁrms: manufacturers
that retail and large corporations.
Examination of FAME data shows that only 18% of the
top 50 companies by turnover have their RO in the CCR, a
third (three) of these are part of the same corporate group.
Of the 123 companies in the high-risk grouping (QS ≤
20), only ﬁve have their RO outside the CCR. Therefore,
the question arises of whether weaker companies have
more durable links with their local areas, which could be
both beneﬁcial and detrimental when considering the sus-
tainability and resilience of a local economy and community.
Even though the QuiScores for companies not head-
quartered in the CCR are in general high (therefore these
top companies could be deemed to be secure), the number
of trading locations could be a cause for concern, especially
if the RO is not in the region and/or the company is a mul-
tinational – location decisions could become a divestment
type choice, where non-ﬁnancial and non-strategic factors,
such as organizational and personal factors, are considered
as deﬁnitely affecting the divestment decision-making pro-
cess (Boddewyn, 1979).
Regional embeddedness of companies
In order to gain an insight into the embeddedness of com-
panies, ﬁrms whose last available QS, before ceasing to
trade, was > 51 (0–1% probability of failing) were exam-
ined. This analysis was conducted through the use of sec-
ondary data sources such as Companies House, The
Gazette and corporate websites.
The analysis of the data on dissolved companies,
shown in Table 6, indicates a pattern where a
Table 4. Analysis of QuiScore based on RO location.
Companies Average score SD Median Average change in QuiScore (%) (n)
All active 1785 56.51 22.34 51 13.83% (n ¼ 1679)
Non-CCR RO 245 74.15 21.06 88 1.31% (n ¼ 244)
CCR RO 1540 52.75 20.87 50 15.95% (n ¼ 1435)
CF RO 972 52.52 21.12 50 16.66% (n ¼ 903)
NP RO 568 53.66 20.98 50 14.76% (n ¼ 532)
Note: CCR, Cardiff Capital Region; CF, Cardiff postcode; NP, Newport postcode; RO, registered ofﬁce.
Table 5. Turnover and trading address analysis.
Companies
Average turnover
(£, thousands)
Median turnover
(£, thousands)
Average trading
addresses
Median trading
addresses
All 1780 186,221 16,986 2.43 1
Non-CCR RO 240 494,236 52,848 10.55 3
CCR RO 1540 37,599 11,094 1.17 1
Note: CCR, Cardiff Capital Region; RO, registered ofﬁce.
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disproportionate number of non-CCR-based companies
had become dissolved, but parent companies or other
branches of the company were still active elsewhere in
the UK or globally. Currently 14% of manufacturers
trading within the CCR have their RO outside the
CCR, yet 33% of the healthy companies dissolved had
their RO outside the CCR. Of note is that the one
CCR-registered company that has re-established itself
was subject to a management buyout, suggesting local
management had conﬁdence in the business (reﬂected
in a healthy QuiScore).
This adds weight to the argument that companies
whose RO is not in the CCR may not have the same
attachment to the CCR, thus they are less locally
embedded. The closure of the Bosch factory in the CCR,
with the loss of 900 jobs, with manufacturing shifting to
‘Eastern’ Europe, is cited within the foreign divestment lit-
erature (cf. McDermott, 2010). Within the CCR there are
several high-proﬁle manufacturing facilities that are parts
of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that were saved
from total closure by the actions of the local management
teams creating viable business plans. This suggests that
the embeddedness of the companies comes from the
employees, who by their very nature are embedded within
the community rather than the corporate entity. This
seems to concur with suggestions that even though an
MNEmay have linkages with the community, there is little
evidence of embeddedness (Phelps, Mackinnon, Stone, &
Braidford, 2003), and that local ﬁrms show greater
adaptability and willingness to exploit local knowledge
(Huh & Park, 2018). Following these restructurings, the
companies seem to be taking a more active role in their
local community, such as being involved in the activities
of UK local enterprise zones (whose remit includes the
development of technology clusters).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The ﬁndings of the present study illustrate how QuiScore
can be used to examine and monitor the resilience of com-
panies. This addresses a signiﬁcant gap in the literature
regarding the lack of measures of ﬁrm resilience, which pre-
vious authors such as Markman and Venzin (2014) have
also highlighted. Though previous work, such as Markman
and Venzin’s VOLAREmeasure, has begun to address this
gap, it only focused on a speciﬁc segment of the banking
sector. We go beyond a speciﬁc sector by examining man-
ufacturers in all their diversity. Additionally, the present
work has value by highlighting how QuiScore can also be
used as an early warning signal for regional economies
regarding potential ﬁrm vulnerabilities, though, as with
any measure, we caution that there is always value in tri-
angulation with other measures.
Our ﬁndings further indicate that the monitoring of the
rate of change in QuiScore and the resulting QuiScore pro-
vides an indicator of the resilience of a company. Steep falls
in QuiScore could indicate potential vulnerability,
especially if ﬁrms fail to stabilize into a ‘steady state’ or,
Table 6. Analysis of companies considered healthy before ceasing to trade.
RO postcode
area
Last
QuiScore
Change in
QuiScore (%)
Trading outside
the CCR
Trading within
the CCR Notes
E14 84 −10.64% Yes No Dissolved due to mergers
NP20 79 −4.82% Yes No Same group as the company
below
NP20 79 −4.82% Yes No Same group as the company
above
SE1 74 −6.33% Yes No Parent company still trading,
postcode ST18
SE1 66 −26.67% Yes Yes Dissolved due to internal
restructuring
NP12 64 0% No No
CF82 58 −35.56% No Yes Management buyout of the
company in administration
M3 58 −24.68% Yes No
SA1 58 −14.71% No No
CF45 58 9.43% No No
CF10 57 11.76% No No
CF24 55 0% No No
CF15 53 −15.87% No No
CF31 53 0% No No
NP4 51 0% No No
CF24 51 4.08% No No
Note: CCR, Cardiff Capital Region; RO, registered ofﬁce.
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as per Valikangas (2010), adapt, resist and respond. The
analysis showed that failing ﬁrms also tended to have sev-
eral consecutive falls in QuiScore, further highlighting
the failure to enter a ‘steady state’.
The study also usefully highlights the potential
source of vulnerabilities for regions, notably where
ﬁrms are embedded. This reinforces the importance for
regional resilience of understanding the wider supply
chains and networks within which ﬁrms (and thus
regions) are connected. When the headquarters locations
are examined, further weight is added to the argument
that companies not registered locally may not have the
same attachment to a particular region. This reinforces
ﬁndings of previous studies, such as by Billington
et al. (2017) and their observations on the importance
of contextual resilience. The present study highlights
the fact that when companies were in distress, those
with strong local management and links were saved
from closure. It further suggests that it would be ben-
eﬁcial for local and regional governments to monitor
regionally important companies.
To sum up, the present work has shown that credit
scores, such as QuiScore, have the potential to provide an
indication of the resilience of companies and regions.
However, QuiScore in isolation provides only a limited
view of the situation for the ﬁnancial reporting period.
The results of this work strongly suggest that when com-
bined with an analysis of the rate of change of QuiScore, a
better measure is obtained. The application of this measure
to data covering the 2008–09 UK recession has shown that
it may also be used to evaluate resilience to economic
shocks through the monitoring of change in QuiScores.
Additionally, the analysis of failed companies showed a
trend where there would be a fall in QuiScore for several
consecutive years before the company ceasing trading.
Therefore, it can be concluded that if a company has
both a poor QuiScore and a signiﬁcant fall in QuiScore,
they are at risk of failing, especially if QuiScore has fallen
for several consecutive years. Further studies in other simi-
lar UK regions would be beneﬁcial in order to conﬁrm this
pattern of behaviour. The managerial implications of this
are twofold. First, it provides managers the opportunity
to take measures to improve the performance of their com-
pany. Second, it can forewarn supply chain managers that
part of their supply chain may have issues and allow risk
mitigation (such as secondary sourcing) to be applied.
The results also suggest that there is utility for this
measure in enhancing the understanding of the role of
company resilience within the context of regional resili-
ence. This could have implications for those working in
local, regional and national government as it could provide
the potential to serve as an early warning indicator of econ-
omic stresses for a region. As stated by Bailey and Berkeley
(2014), appropriate interventions could be seen as critical in
enabling recovery. Examples include the ProAct scheme in
Wales (Sensier & Artis, 2016) and ﬁscal stimulus packages
(Davies, 2011). The exploratory study on the CCR has
helped illuminate aspects of this relationship, namely, the
differing vulnerabilities of industrial sectors and subsectors,
thus enabling policy-makers to identify better the compa-
nies and/or industrial sectors that may be at risk, as differ-
ent business sectors beneﬁted differently to responses to the
2008–09 economic crisis (Davies, 2011). It has also been
suggested that the resilience of different ﬁrms is associated
with the location of the headquarters in that high QuiScore
companies (operating in ‘steady state’) tend to be registered
outside the region.
Use of QuiScore data can provide an indicator of vul-
nerabilities associated with the variable embeddedness of
resilient ﬁrms in the region’s economy. The data suggest
that non-CCR-registered companies tend to have higher
QuiScores and are considered healthier. It also shows
that they seem to be more likely to cease their operations
within the CCR whilst maintaining operations elsewhere
(nationally or internationally). Two cases were presented
to illustrate this behaviour: MNEs that wished to close
operations in the CCR, and only through the efforts of
local management were they able to maintain a manufac-
turing presence. The embeddedness of MNEs will be
further tested by Brexit; as the literature suggests, it may
have a negative long-term impact on foreign direct invest-
ment (Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, & Van Reenen,
2016; Kierzenkowski, Pain, Rusticelli, & Zwart, 2016;
Sampson, 2017).
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER WORK
This work has focused on the study of the CCR. As such,
there are limitations regarding the generalizability of the
ﬁndings. Therefore, it is proposed that there needs to be
an evaluation and comparison with other regions, particu-
larly within the UK. Although it is unlikely that the CCR
will be wholly unique, the analysis of other regions is
necessary. Of particular interest would be the analysis of
QuiScore for dissolved companies, which could further
determine the utility of this approach.
The focus of this study has also been limited to the man-
ufacturing sector. Further insights could be gained by
expanding the analysis to include sectors such as agriculture
and the service sector, not only to encompass a larger portion
of the economy but also to examine if there are differences in
how different sectors respond to shocks and stresses.
Furthermore, as the study excluded smaller, and other,
manufacturing enterprises that did not have a QuiScore,
studies could examine the utility of other potential resili-
ence measures such as Altman’s Z-score (Pal, Torstensson,
& Mattila, 2011).
There is also a need to conduct more detailed longitudi-
nal studies on individual companies to see how they
responded to shocks and falls in their resilience scores, as
well as examining territorial (contextual) factors that may
have an impact on the interpretation of the results.
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